

VZCZCXRO0716
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #5920 3550408
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 210408Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5012
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 6661
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T KABUL 005920

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, S/CT, SCA/A,
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN,
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76,
TREASURY FOR APARAMESWARAN, ABAUKOL,
STATE PASS USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PINR](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [AF](#)
SUBJECT: BAGHLAN WARLORD AMIR GUL RELEASED

REF: A. KABUL 05679

[1](#)B. KABUL 03317
[1](#)C. HOTR WASHINGTON DC 300715Z JUL06

Classified By: Richard B. Norland, Deputy Chief of Mission; reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (S) Post learned on 12 December that Baghlan warlord Amir Gul, detained in National Directorate of Security (NDS) custody since his July 2006 capture by Afghan National Army (ANA) and coalition forces, has been released despite recommendations to the contrary made by the Ambassador, COMISAF, and UNAMA Special Representative (reftel A) to President Karzai on November 30. A Dutch polmil officer whose translator spoke to Gul by phone on 12 December advised that Gul said he was enjoying his new-found freedom with a large group of well-wishers.

[1](#)2. (S) Post's Rule of Law coordinator met on 13 December with Attorney General Sabit, who had reviewed the evidence against Gul at the request of President Karzai (reftel A). Sabit did not personally defend Gul or question the international community's stance regarding the dangers of releasing Gul and suggested that his personal view was that Gul had probably planned to sell the weapons found in his compound. Sabit advised, however, that the file he received on Gul did not support those charges or any others regarding Gul's danger to coalition forces. Gul had stated that the weapons captured on his compound in July were contributions for Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG); Sabit viewed this defense as bolstered by DIAG's previous positive comments about Gul. AG Sabit also said that the NDS favored Gul's release and had done virtually no follow-up investigation or interrogation based on the evidence detailed in reftels B and C, which implicated Gul in attacks against coalition forces. AG Sabit confirmed that the file he reviewed at President Karzai's request consisted almost entirely of reports from the US and those involved in the initial seizure, along with photos of the weapons seized. He also specified that the NDS had done "nothing" to connect Gul to an alleged murder of a Canadian (reftel A).

[1](#)3. (S) AG Sabit said provincial officials and MPs had put Karzai under serious pressure to release Gul. President Karzai was prepared to release Gul outright, but Sabit had

insisted on bail in the form of signatures from two Baghlan MPs (Nazar Mohammed of the Meshrano Jirga and Shukria Easakhail of the Wolesi Jirga), assuring Gul would be available to prosecutors at any time. Rumors swirl, but post's efforts to elicit more concrete information about the pressures on Karzai have been unfruitful.

¶4. (C) Comment: Whether corrupt governors and police chiefs, or provincial power brokers of dubious repute, Karzai is constantly juggling international pressure to remove or detain such individuals, with tribal and clan pressures to let them be. The Amir Gul case is particularly worrisome in that the GOA appears to have done very little to investigate the suspicions of anti-Coalition activity that centered on Gul when he was first detained. We expect that Gul will be under close scrutiny in the days ahead and thus unlikely to engage in anti-Coalition activity, but we will work with AG Sabit to try to keep this case open. (end comment)
NEUMANN